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Case No. 970582-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, EUGENE H. FINDLAY, 
CRAIG ZWICK, P. K. MOHANTY, DEAN W. HOLBROOK, 
AND ALAN W. DEARDEN 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, a general partner of a limited partnership that 
sold real property to defendant Utah Department of 
Transportation, brings this appeal from two orders of the Third 
Judicial District Court, the first dismissing with prejudice 11 
claims against the Utah Department of Transportation, Eugene H. 
Findlay, Craig Zwick, P. K. Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, and Alan 
W. Dearden (the State defendants) (Addendum, attached: R. 337-
40), and the second granting summary judgment for the remaining 
individual defendants (Brief of Appellees Beatty and Bullock at 
Addendum 2: R. 348-52) . Jurisdiction lies within this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996), as the case 
was poured over from the Supreme Court of Utah by order dated 
September 23, 1997. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Plaintiff's sole appellate claim with respect to the State 
defendants is that the trial court erred m holding that his 
sixth through eighth causes of action are not contract actions 
but actions regarding real property, governed by Utah Code Ann 
§ 63-30-6 (1993) (see Brief of Appellant at 1). Plaintiff raised 
the issue in his memorandum (R. 271-73) opposing the State 
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction \R 142-44). The district court 
granted defendants' motion in its entirety by order dated April 
2, 1997 (R 337-40), specifically treating the challenged causes 
as actions involving property ana holding them time-barred under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 338). 
Standard of Review- An appellate court "review[s] for 
correction of error a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Schwenke v. Smith, 942 
P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court for decision is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiff, a California resident and general partner of 
Bullock Sc Beatty Associates, a limited partnership (R. 4, f 15), 
filed this action on March 1, 1996 (R. 1-109). In ten causes of 
action, he alleged that defendants had violated his statutory and 
partnership rights by completing the sale of partnership property 
to the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) without his 
written assent. Nearly two years earlier, he had filed suit on 
the same claims against the same defendants in federal district 
court (R. 147, f 6 and the exhibit cited therein). The federal 
court dismissed the case as to the State defendants on the basis 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity (R. 14 7, %% 7-8 and the exhibits 
cited therein). In the present case the State defendants, 
acknowledging that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) gave 
plaintiff one year from the date of the federal dismissal to 
commence a new action, moved to dismiss the complaint, filed more 
than three months after the one-year deadline, as time-barred (R. 
142-50) . The state district court granted the motion by order of 
April 2, 1997 (R. 337-40) . Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 
from this order on May 2, 1997 (R. 346-47), following 
announcement of summary judgment in favor of the remaining 
defendants on April 3, 1997 (R. 341-45). After the summary 
judgment was reduced to a written order on May 7, 1997 (R. 348-
52), he filed a separate notice of appeal on June 3, 1997 as to 
the private defendants (R. 355-56) . Mistakenly forwarded to this 
3 
Court, the appeal was transferred to tne Supreme Court of Utah 
under Utah R. App. P. 44 (R, 360-61), which returned it to this 
Court for disposition under its pour-over jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
At the time the cause of action arose, plaintiff, a 
California resident, was one of four general partners of the 
limited partnership Bullock & Beatty Associates; two of the other 
general partners were defendants Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance 
Beatty (R. 4, %% 15-16). The partnership owned real property in 
Provo Canyon (R. 6, H 23) that UDOT sought to acquire. On 
October 25, 1991, UDOT made the partnership an offer to purchase 
the property for $510,000.00 (Brief of Appellees Beatty and 
Bullock at Addendum 5: R. 43-44) . A contract of sale carrying 
the same date was signed for the partnership by general partners 
Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance Beatty (id. at Addendum 5: R. 42); 
defendant Beatty also signed (K 42 as attorney-in-fact for 
Marie B. Bullock (R. 40-41), a limited partner (R. 5, H 18). 
Plaintiff allegedly was nor .nfcrmed of ami did not consent 
to the sale before the contract was signed and delivered to UDOT 
(R, 9, H 30; R. 97). On January 13, 1992, he wrote to defendant 
Dearden, expressing hope that the sale could be consummated but 
indicating his belief that his signature on the contract was 
required (R. 47-49). In the letter ne referred to a January 2, 
1992 telephone conversation with Mr. Dearden in which he had 
raised the same concern (R. 47). 
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On March 4, 1992, Reed A. Bullock, J. Vance Beatty, and 
Marie B. Bullock, on behalf of the partnership, signed several 
deeds transferring ownership of the property to UDOT (R. 12, 
1 36; R.. 58-71) . On March 24, 1992, UDOT issued payment in the 
amount of $510,000.00 to the partnership (R. 14-15, f 41). On 
September 10, 1992, the partnership sent plaintiff a check in the 
amount of $67,198.43 for his share of proceeds from the sale, 
with a note explaining the distribution of the UDOT payment (R. 
285). Plaintiff endorsed and negotiated the check (R. 286). His 
federal and state lawsuits, attacking the contract's validity, 
ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When a court dismisses a timely cause of action without 
adjudicating the merits and the time for commencing suit has 
lapsed, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) provides a one-year 
window for commencement of a new action. Although the non-merits 
dismissal of plaintiff's federal suit entitled him to this one-
year "grace period," plaintiff did not bring the action at bar 
until more than fifteen months after his federal suit was 
dismissed--over three months after the one-year window expire 1. 
To avoid dismissal of the present case, plaintiff argues that his 
complaint was timely because it is based on a written contract 
and thus governed by the six-year statute of limitations for 
contract actions found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1996). 
This argument disregards the fact that none of his claims against 
5 
the State defendants is based on the contractual rights and 
obligations of UDOT and the partnership, the contracting parties. 
It further ignores that plaintiff, neither a party to the 
contract nor an intended third party beneficiary, lacks standing 
to sue on the contract. Plaintiff's claims, sounding in tort, 
are untimely under deadlines imposed by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, even as enlarged by section 78-12-40's one-year 
window. Moreover, plaintiff has waived any argument based on 
third party beneficiary status by not raising it below, and the 
issue is insufficiently briefed for consideration on appeal. 
Finally, even if the contract claims were otherwise proper, they 
cannot go forward against the individual State defendants because 
the waiver of immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1993) for 
actions based on contract rights and obligations applies only to 
governmental entities, not to individual employees. 
Public policy supports this result, The purpose of a 
contract is to define the relationship between the contracting 
parties, enhancing stability and predictability in the parties' 
course of dealing. Contract terms that specify procedures for 
notice and commencement of suit over contract disputes help to 
clarify that relationship and to make the course of dispute 
resolution predictable. Imposing external procedural constraints 
on enforcement of negotiated rights and obligations may thwart 
the parties' intent and deprive them of the benefit of their 
bargain. Section 63-30-5's exemption responds to this concern. 
However, because a contract does not bind those, such as 
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plaintiff, who are not parties to it, their claims must be 
governed by alternative means. The statutory notice and 
commencement requirements for non-contractual claims under the 
immunity act serve this purpose. 
Neither the relaxed rules of notice pleading nor amendment 
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can assist plaintiff. 
The record does not contain evidence that can support plaintiff's 
contract claims, and defendants have never argued that they had 
insufficient notice of these issues. Amendment and notice 
pleading may save plaintiff from maladroit language but cannot 
supply the missing elements of his legal theory. 
For these reasons, the State defendants urge the Court to 
affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case against them. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORPECTLY HELD PLAINTIFF'S 
SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION TIME-BARRED 
AS ACTIONS REGARDING PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff's sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action 
against the State defendants were dismissed on the sole ground of 
his failure to meet the statute of limitations imposed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), which provides a window for filing a 
new action after a timely prior suit is dismissed without 
adjudication of the merits: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
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and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
Plaintiff commenced the present suit more than fifteen months 
after the dismissal of his federal suit on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds and well after the time to file suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act had expired. Therefore, plaintiff's 
claims against the State defendants can be considered timely only 
if they are somehow exempt from the immunity act's procedures for 
notice of claim and commencement of suit. Plaintiff conceded 
below that section 78-12-40 does not save his eighth cause of 
action, seeking quiet title to the partnership property (see R. 
411-12), as Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 (1993), which explicitly 
controls quiet title actions, contains no exemption from these 
procedural requirements (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-12 (1993) 
and -15 (1993)) and is therefore subject to the one-year window. 
Nonetheless, on appeal he advances the argument that this claim, 
as well as his sixth and seventh causes of action--for, 
respectively, rescission of the contract of sale and a legal 
declaration of his rights in the transferred property--should not 
have been dismissed as untimely. He premises the argument on his 
characterization of all three claims as arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 
(1993), which expressly exempts contract actions from the notice 
and commencement requirements as follows: "Immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
8 
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 
63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19" 
(governing the requisites of notice of claim, commencement, and 
undertaking). Appellant contends that if the challenged causes 
of action arise out of contractual rights and obligations, they 
are governed by the six-year statute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1996) for actions "upon any 
contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing" (with exceptions not relevant here) and are 
consequently timely.1 
'The complaint's sixth cause of action seeks rescission of 
the contract, the seventh seeks declaratory relief, and the 
eighth seeks quiet title, all of which are arguably equitable 
remedies. However, it is well settled that equitable relief is 
appropriate only where legal remedies, such as damages, are 
inadequate. See, e.g., Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P,2d 
1034, 1040 (Utah 1995) (holding that " [t]he right to an equitable 
remedy is an exceptional one, and absent statutory mandate, 
equitable relief should be granted only when a court determines 
that damages are inadequate and that equitable relief will result 
in more perfect and complete justice"); see also Delivery Serv. 
and Transfer Co. v. Heiner Equip. & Supply Co., 635 P.2d 21, 21 
(Utah 1981) (holding that equitable remedy "is normally only 
granted when damages may not accurately be ascertained or would 
not adequately compensate the plaintiff"); accord Erisman v. 
Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 262-63, 358 P.2d 85, 88 (1961); 
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah App. 1997). 
In the present case, Bullock has not argued, much less shown, 
that the damages remedy he seeks is inadequate. Moreover, 
Eullock never raised the issue of whether equitable claims ai . 
subject to governmental immunity in response to the State 
defendants' motion to dismiss below and, therefore, could not 
raise it now for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Bundy v. 
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) (noting that 
matters neither raised in the pleadings nor placed at issue 
before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal). In any event, since Bullock himself admits that his 
complaint against the State defendants is seeking monetary 
damages (see Aplt.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition at 2, H i ) , the State defendants' 
motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity is appropriate. 
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Plaintiff's argument is not well taken. The limited scope 
of section 63-30-5's exemption does not reach his claims. Under 
the contract (R. 42), the partnership was obligated, in return 
for the right to a cash payment of $510,000.00, to deliver deed 
to the property at issue to defendant Dearden in escrow for UDOT 
and to pay all 1991 property taxes assessed against the parcel; 
UDOT was obligated to pay the partnership $510,000.00 in exchange 
for a right to ownership of the property. Plaintiff did not 
allege that these contract rights and obligations were breached; 
to the contrary, he alleged that their fulfillment violated his 
rights under statute, under the partnership agreement, and 
through conspiracy and fraud. These claims are wholly collateral 
to the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, UDOT 
and the partnership.2 Because they involve matters wholly 
2Plaintiff erroneously declares that " [t]he State Defendants 
entered into a contract for the purchase of real property in 
Provo Canyon with the Individual Defendants who, without 
authority, acted for the limited partnership" (Brief of Appellant 
at 8). This statement misrepresents the transaction, which was 
between UDOT and the partnership entity not the individual 
defendants. Both the offer (R 43-44 and the contract (R 42) 
identify Bullock & Beatty Associates as the property owner, 
contracting party, and grantor Plaintiff failed to provide any 
contrary evidence in the court below; in fact, his complaint 
specifically states that at all relevant times, the partnership 
"owned, and held all of the right, title, and interest in and to" 
the property in question (R. 6, % 23). While plaintiff may have 
a cause of action against the partnership for violation of his 
rights as a partner, he has articulated no basis for individual 
standing to sue UDOT on the contract itself, to which he was not 
individually a party. See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 
(Utah 1984) ("Unless plaintiff could show that he suffered direct 
injury personally, as distinguished from injury to the 
partnership, this complaint was properly dismissed") . The Kemp 
court further rejected the plaintiff's attempt to sue only on his 
portion of the partnership claim, stating that " [a]llowing 
plaintiff to go forward individually could subject defendants to 
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outside the contract rights and obligations, plaintiff cannot 
escape the lapsed statute of limitations by invoking section 
63-30-5. 
Precedent supports this outcome. The essence of plaintiff's 
complaint against the State defendants is that they are holding 
his property without right. The supreme court has previously 
indicated that such claims are properly cognizable under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-6. In Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 
(Utah 1990), Hansen sued under section 63-30-6 for destruction of 
improvements to his property during implementation of the 
county's flood control program. The court rejected Hansen's 
claim, noting that because Hansen had not alleged that his 
property was being held without right, section 63-30-6 did not 
apply to his claim. See Hansen, 794 P.2d at 847. The corollary 
of this holding is that claims such as plaintiff's, involving 
possession or ownership of real property, fall within the ambit 
of section 63-30-6 and are thereby subject to the notice and 
commencement constraints of sections 63-30-12 and -15, as well as 
the expanded statute of limitations provided by section 78-12-40. 
Plaintiff argues that under Hansen, "several waivers could 
apply to the same activity" (Brief of Appellant at 10) . While 
defendants agree that multiple waivers may apply to a single set 
multiple liability and could spawn multiple litigation among the 
partnership, the individual partners, and defendants. This would 
be unfair to absent partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary 
to judicial economy." Id. at 761. The court held that rules 
17(a) and 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "forbid such 
a result." Id. 
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of facts, they do not agree that the facts of this case bring it 
within the scope of section 63-30-5. Every appellate case 
addressing the waiver of immunity under section 63-30-5 has 
involved only issues regarding the rights and obligations imposed 
by the contract; none has extended the statute's reach to the 
contract's underlying validity.3 Moreover, as the supreme court 
has recognized, causes of action arising from breach of a 
contract term are contractual in nature, while breaches of duty 
growing out of a contract are tortious in character. See DCR 
Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983) (citing 
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Cal. 
1980). The DCR court also favorably observed Professor Prosser's 
distinction between contract actions, "'created to protect the 
interest in having promises performed,'" and tort actions, 
3See/ e.g., Farmers New WorId Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful 
City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) "(discussing City's liability for 
flood control under right-of-way agreement for a creek easement); 
Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1984) (regarding liability arising from sanitary district's 
contract to own and operate sewer line); Foster v. Salt Lake 
County, 632 P.2d 810 (Utah 1981) (treating County's liability 
under program of automobile self-insurance); Baugh v. Logan City, 
27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972) (examining City's duties 
under an oral contract to convey land)/ Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994)(contemplating plaintiff's claims 
allegedly arising out of his lease with the State and his permit 
to operate dog-training activities); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 
(Utah App. 1994) (concerning Stage's liability arising from the 
Department of Financial Institutions' breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contracts); Neel v. 
State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993) (addressing the State's 
liability for breach of contract of which plaintiff was intended 
third party beneficiary). Notably, the plaintiffs in all of 
these cases are either the contracting parties themselves or 
obvious intended third party beneficiaries whose standing to sue 
is clear. See n.l, supra. 
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'"created to protect the interest in freedom from various kinds 
of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are 
imposed by law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and 
not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties 
. . . .' Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 613." DCR, 663 
P.2d 435 (quoting Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1335). Because plaintiff's 
interest lies not in the performance of contract promises, but m 
protection against harm growing from the alleged voidness of the 
transaction their performance effected, his claims against the 
State defendants sound in tort, not contract, and section 63-30-5 
does not apply to them. 
Plaintiff has cited no authority to the contrary He points 
only to the complaint's inclusion of the word 'contract" in the 
sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action to establish their 
contractual nature However, none of the challenged causes 
contains any claim that the terns of the contract have been 
breached The sixth cause of action (R 25-27) complains only 
that the contract was made initially without plaintiff's 
knowledge and ultimately without his consent, matters beyond the 
scope of the rights and obligations internal to the contract. 
The seventh cause of action (R 27-29) seeks to invalidate th, 
sale on the ground that the contract was void ab initio--again, 
an issue external to the performance of the contract terms The 
eighth cause of action (R. 29-30), the quiet title action 
referenced above, is based on the allegation that the contract 
and deeds were legally ineffective to transfer ownership of the 
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property, a claim hot within the parties' interest in performance 
of the contract promises. Plaintiff's attempted characterization 
of his causes of action as contractual claims simply fails the 
supreme court's DCR analysis. 
Utah's appellate courts have consistently rejected attempts 
by plaintiffs to recharacterize their claims in order to avoid 
the defense of governmental immunity. In Gillman v. Department 
of Financial Institutions. 782 P,2d 506, 509 (Utah 1989), the 
supreme court refused to treat injuries arising from immunized 
licensing decisions as arising from non-immunized negligence. 
Likewise, in DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 
App. 1994), this Court declined to handle a claim based on 
immunized approval of a planned unit development plat as non-
immunized negligent design of an intersection. Numerous cases 
have rebuffed attempts to recharacterize immunized assault and 
battery as varieties of non-immunized negligence.4 
As the supreme court held in Ledfors v. Emery County School 
District. 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993), " [T]he structure of 
4Rejected non-immune causes of action include negligent 
failure to institute safety measures (Taylor v. Qgden City Sch. 
Dist. . 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996)); negligent failure to apprehend 
(Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996)); negligent 
implementation of inmate prerelease and intense supervision 
parole programs (Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994)); 
negligent employment, instruction, and contracting (S.H. v. 
State. 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993)); negligent hiring and retention 
(Petersen v. Bd. of Educ.. 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993)); negligent 
diagnosis, treatment, and supervision (Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)); negligent failure to supervise 
and protect (Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.. 849 P.2d 1162 
(Utah 1993)); and negligent hiring and supervision (Wright v. 
Univ. of Utah. 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App. 1994)). 
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the Utah Governmental Immunity Act . . . focuses on the conduct 
or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of 
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence 
alleged." See also DeVilliers, 882 P.2d at 1166; Wright, 876 
P.2d at 383. The focus of the situation from which plaintiff's 
sixth through eighth causes of action arose is not the 
performance of contractual rights and obligations, as 
contemplated by section 63-30-5(1), but plaintiff's right to 
title or possession of real property and a determination of the 
State's adverse claim to it, as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-6 (1993): 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of any property real or 
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet 
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or 
secure any adjudication touch:ng any mortgage or other 
lien said entity may have or claim on the property 
involved. 
Because plaintiff has failed io provide any legal support 
showing that the immunity act's contract waiver provision applies 
to his sixth through eighth causes of action, Utah's liberalized 
notice pleading rule cannot assist him (see Brief of Appellant at 
12-14) . In language cited by plaintiff himself (Brief of 
Appellant at 13), the supreme court has stated that " [w]hat [the 
parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all 
that is required." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 
86, 91 (1963). Defendants have never contended that the 
complaint was insufficient to give them notice of plaintiff's 
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claims; in fact, they have successfully met those claims. They 
have argued only that the court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claims because, as claims involving 
property, they are untimely. Defendants' success is no ground 
for overcoming plaintiff's failure to identify facts fulfilling 
the elements of a contract claim and triggering an exemption from 
the statute of limitations under the immunity act. Notice 
pleading may cure inartful language, but it does not convert 
tortious acts into contract violations, lengthen statutes of 
limitations, or supply missing components of a legal theory. 
Plaintiff's brief makes a fleeting reference to Utah R. Civ, 
P. 15(b), suggesting that the trial court should have allowed 
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence (Brief of 
Appellant at 14). However, rule 15(b) permits a motion for 
amendment to conform to the evidence to "be made upon motion of 
any party at any time." Plaintiff has cited to no motion of 
record making such a request, and scrutiny of the docket reveals 
nore. More importantly, however plaintiff's ^ule 15(b) 
argument, as his notice pleading z rgurue^t, nibses the point: 
conforming the pleadings to show t-.ha*" d contract theory was 
raised would not alter the fact that it was found without merit. 
Plaintiff's claims were dismissed not because his complaint 
failed to properly articulate a contract cause of action that was 
supported by the facts of record, but because he failed to adduce 
the facts that would support it. Consequently, the record 
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provides no basis for conformance of the pleadings to plaintiff's 
contract theory. 
II. PLAINTIFF HAS NO STATUS AS AN INTENDED THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARY THAT WOULD PERMIT HIM A SEPARATE RECOVERY 
UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff mentions in passing that as "an intended third 
party beneficiary to the contract, he is brought into the purview 
of the contract and Section 63-30-5(1), whether or not he 
personally entered into the contract himself" (Brief of Appellant 
at 10). Plaintiff identifies no part of the record in which the 
issue of third party beneficiary status was raised or ruled upon, 
and defendants have been unable to locate any reference to it in 
the proceedings below. Under Utah's appellate precedents, "it is 
axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal." Franklin Fin, v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); see also Ong 
Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 
(Utah 1993) (rejecting contention that appellate court should 
reach "new points raised for the first time on appeal because 
they are really new arguments as opposed to new issues. We 
decline to honor such a distinction. Our concern is whether an 
argument was addressed in the first instance to the trial 
court"); Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah 
App. 1989) (requiring an issue not "timely presented to the trial 
court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon" to be 
"deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their 
merits on appeal") ; Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
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Inc. , 761 P. 2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) ("rule applies even where 
facts are not disputed and issue raised is one of law") ; James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that "[i]n 
Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the 
trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal" and stating 
that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted 
to the trial court and the trial court has had the opportunity to 
make findings of fact or law") , By not raising it in the 
district court, plaintiff has waived any argument based on third 
party beneficiary status. 
Even if it were properly before the Court, plaintiff's third 
party beneficiary theory cannot succeed. In support of this 
proposition plaintiff cites to Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah 
App. 1993). Neel is inapposite. There was no question in Neel 
that Neel was an intended third party beneficiary of the State's 
self-insurance program (see 854 P,2d at 583); the issue was 
whether the State could be sued in contract as an insurer despite 
a statutory definition of "insurer" that excluded state entities. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not adduced facts that would 
bring him within the scope of an intended third party 
beneficiary. 
Under supreme court precedent, " [w]hether a third-party 
beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written 
contract." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 
930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). The court's test requires that 
"'[t]he intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate 
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and distinct benefit must be clear.'" Id. (quoting Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 1382, 
1386 (Utah 1989)) . Further, "' [a] third party who benefits only 
incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right to 
recover under that contract.'" Id. (quoting Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 537 (Utah 1993)). Plaintiff's 
glancing reference to third party beneficiary status cites no 
provision of the written contract that shows the intent of the 
partnership and UDOT to confer any benefit on him that is 
separate and distinct from the benefit he derives as a partner. 
Instead, his benefit, the proportionate share he derived from the 
partnership's proceeds of sale, is incidental to his status as a 
partner, and he therefore has no right, apart from the 
partnership, to recover under the contract. 
In order to challenge the court's legal conclusions, 
appellant must comply with rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a) (9^  requires that " [t]he argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." See also First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 
958, 962 (Utah 1993) (refusing to reach an inadequately briefed 
issue "[ajbsent a compelling reason why we should waive 
application of rule 24(a)(9)"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Qpsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 84 
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(111. App. 1981) ("'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research'")). Plaintiff's one-sentence 
assumption of third party beneficiary status, made without 
argument as to the applicable criteria, simply does not meet the 
necessary showing under the rule and for this reason, does not 
merit the Court's consideration. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT CONSIDERATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AS CONTRACT ISSUES. 
The district court's refusal to use section 63-30-5 to 
salvage Bullock's claims is also supported by the logic 
underlying contract claims. As this Court has observed, "a 
fundamental purpose of any contract is to define the relationship 
of the contracting parties and provide the maximum possible 
stability and predictability to that relationship, thereby 
minimizing the effect of chance or luck." Home Sav. and Loan v. 
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 351 (Utah App. 1991). 
This purpose would be disserved by imposing procedural 
requirements on the contracting parties that are external to the 
contract itself. In defining the contracting parties' 
relationship, contracts generally carry their own notice and 
filing provisions, making statutory notice and procedural 
requirements unnecessary and duplicative or, worse, 
contradictory. Many individuals and businesses may be hesitant 
to enter into a contract with a governmental entity if the entity 
can breach the contract and then escape liability on grounds of 
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the performing party's failure to follow procedures not a part of 
the parties' mutual understanding and negotiated agreement. 
However, the reasons supporting section 63-30-5's exemption 
from the notice and procedural provisions of the governmental 
immunity act also dictate that the statute applies only to claims 
involving the determination of the parties' rights and 
obligations under a valid contract, and not to claims, such as 
those at bar, in which the validity of the underlying contract is 
challenged by one who stands as a stranger to it. The contract 
can govern the conduct of only those who are parties to it; its 
terms cannot bind non-parties such as plaintiff. In order to 
assure timely processing and progress of claims not governed by 
contract, binding procedural provisions for notice of claims and 
commencement of suit must be implemented elsewhere. The 
statutory sections from which contract claims are exempted 
fulfill this need. Plaintiff, as a non-party to the contract at 
issue, stands in no different position with respect to the State 
than any other claimant whose role is not a contractual one, and 
he must follow the statutory requisites in order to pursue his 
claims. 
IV. SECTION 63-30-5 DOES NOT WAIVE IMMUNITY AS TO 
INDIVIDUAL STATE EMPLOYEES. 
Finally, even if the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against 
the State defendants were not subject to affirmance in their 
entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction below, based on 
untimeliness, the district court's decision should nonetheless be 
upheld as to Eugene H. Findiay, Craig Zwick, P. K. Mohanty, Dean 
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W. Holbrook, and Alan W. Dearden because these individual State 
defendants do not come within the purview of section 63-30-5, 
The language of that section specifically states: "Immunity from 
suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (1993) (emphasis 
added). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) (1993) defines 
,!
 [g] overnmental entity" as "the state and its political 
subdivisions as defined in this chapter," "Political 
subdivision," in turn, is defined as "any county, city, town, 
school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, 
special improvement or taxing district, or other governmental 
subdivision or public corporation." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7) 
(1993). Thus, by the plain language of section 63-30-5, it does 
not apply to individual State employees, but only to governmental 
entities. 
This Court held as much in Nielson v. Gurlev, 888 P.2d 130 
(Utah App. 1994). In the Court's words, "While the statutes that 
extend sovereign immunity include both entities and individual 
state employees, section 63-30-5 waives the nouice requirements 
and substantive immunity for claims arising irom 'any contractual 
obligation' only as concerns 'all governmental entities.' 
Section 63-30-5 does not waive the notice requirements for a suit 
against a state employee . . . notwithstanding a nexus between 
the claim asserted and 'any contractual obligation.'" Nielson, 
888 P,2d at 135 (citations omitted). Thus, the waiver of 
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immunity applicable to contract claims is not applicable to 
plaintiff's complaint against the individual State defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is neither a party to nor an intended third party 
beneficiary of the contract here at issue. As a stranger to the 
contract, he is without standing to sue on actions arising out of 
the contractual rights and obligations. Although he may sue on 
the contract's underlying validity, his action resonates in tort, 
not in contract; for this reason, he must comply with the notice 
and commencement provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
and the one-year "grace period" for new actions filed after 
dismissal of a prior complaint other than on the merits. He has 
not done so. While contracts generally provide their own notice 
and commencement provisions for suit, reflecting the negotiated 
agreement of the parties, plaintiff, as an individual, has not 
entered into a contract with the State defendants and cannot 
avoid the procedural strictures of the controlling statutes for 
actions regarding property by recharacterizing his claim as a 
contractual one. 
Plaintiff did not move below for amendment of the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence and cannot now capitalize on that 
failure. Further, because the record does not contain the 
necessary evidence to support his contract theory, a motion to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence could not have succeeded. 
For the same reason, plaintiff's reliance on notice pleading is 
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misplaced: even if he had clearly articulated a contract claim, 
the facts of record do not support it. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, the State 
defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the district 
court's dismissal of all claims against them. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The State defendants do not believe oral argument is 
necessary to the proper disposition of this case. However, they 
desire to participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court. 
Defendants do believe, however, that a published opinion could be 
helpful in defining the distinction between contractually based 
claims subject to procedural waivers under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and tort claims that must comply with the act's 
procedural constraints. 
DATED this \[r^ day of March, 1998. 
( ^ LSz 
NANCY t. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State Defendants/Appellees 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD B. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING STATE 
: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
v. 
The State of Utah Dept. of Transportation, 
Eugene H. Findlay, Craig Zwick, P. K. : 
Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, Alan W. 
Dearden, J. Vance Beatty, Faye B. Beatty, : 
the estate Reed A. Bullock, deceased, the 
personal representative of Reed A. Bullock, : 
Cleo H. Bullock, Cleo H. Bullock, individually, : Case No. 960901457CV 
and John Does 1-50, inclusive, 
: Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendants. 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by The State of Utah Department of Transportation, Eugene H. 
Findlay, Craig Zwick, P.K. Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, and Alan W. Deardon (hereinafter 
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collectively "State defendants") came before the court for hearing on January 28,1997 and 
February 24,1997. Plaintiff, Richard B. Bullock, was represented by Kevin Olsen. The State 
defendants were represented by Martha S. Stonebrook, Assistant Attorney General. The court, 
having reviewed the pleadings and having heard the oral arguments of the parties, hereby enters 
the following Order: 
ORDER 
The State defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety, and all claims brought 
against the State defendants by plaintiff are hereby dismissed with prejudice, as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action are actions regarding real 
property and are governed by the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, including 
U.C.A. § 63-30-6; 
a. Plaintiff failed to bring the Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action against the 
State defendants in this court within one year following fhe dismissal of his complaint in federal 
court; 
b. Plaintiffs Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action are therefore time barred and 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiffs Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are for intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, respectively, and plaintiff conceded that these two claims are 
governed by the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. This court therefore rules that 
the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are time barred under the Governmental Immunity Act and 
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those causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. 
It is so ordered this Z- day of April, 1997. 
By the court: 
Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Kevin V. Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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